Voting to Tell Others
Online Appendix

Stefano DellaVigna
UC Berkeley and NBER

John A. List
U Chicago and NBER

Ulrike Malmendier
UC Berkeley and NBER

Gautam Rao
Harvard University and NBER

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A   Appendix A - Mathematical Appendix

Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. We consider first the probability of being at home and opening the door. As discussed in the text, the probability it will be: (i) h_0 in the absence of flyer, or if the person does not see the flyer; (ii) $h^* = \max\left[\min\left[h_0 + \eta\max\left(s + m - c, -S\right), 1\right], 0\right]$ if the person saw a survey flyer, and (iii) $h^* = \max\left[\min\left[h_0 + \eta^i \max\left(s + m - c + z, -S\right), 1\right], 0\right]$ if the person saw an election flyer. Under *Pride in Voting*, $z^v = \max\left(s_V, s_N - L\right) \geq s_V$ is positive. Hence, h^* will be at least as high under FE than under F for voters. Conversely, under *Stigma from Not Voting*, $z^{nv} = \max\left(s_V - L, s_N\right)$ is negative, and hence h^* will be lower under FE than under F for non-voters. Under opt-out, a person who sees the flyer will opt out (and hence set $h^* = 0$) if $s + m - c < 0$ under OO and if $s + m - c + z < 0$ under OOE. Under *Pride in Voting*, z^v is positive; hence, for any set of parameters, if the person opts out under OOE, she will also do so under OO (but not the converse). Hence, for any given set of parameters treatment, the probability of opening the door is lower under OO than under OOE and thus $P(H)^v_{OOE} \geq P(H)^v_{OO}$. Conversely, under *Stigma from Not Voting*, z^{nv} is negative so the converse result applies and $P(H)^{nv}_{OOE} \leq P(H)^{nv}_{OO}$ follows.

Turning to the probability of answering a survey, conditional on opening the door, an individual will agree to the survey if $s + m - c + z \geq -S$ assuming she knows that the survey has an election topic and if $s + m - c \geq -S$ in case she does not know. By the same token as above, holding constant the selection into opening the door, the person will be more likely to complete the survey if informed about the election topic under *Pride* and if not informed under *Stigma*. Hence, the conclusion $P(SV)^v_I \geq P(SV)^v_{NI}$ under *Pride* and $P(SV)^{nv}_I \leq P(SV)^{nv}_{NI}$ under *Stigma* hold (remember that the treatments I and NI take place after the sorting decision).

To consider the effect of F and FE on $P(SV)$ we need to take into account the selection into opening the door. We consider separately the following four exhaustive cases: (i) $\max(s + m - c + z, s + m - c) < -S$. In this case, $P(SV) = 0$ under any condition; (ii) $\min(s + m - c + z, s + m - c) \geq -S$. In this case, the person will complete the survey conditional on opening the door, so $P(H) = P(SV)$, and the comparison follows from the results above on $P(H)$; (iii) $s + m - c + z < -S \leq s + m - c$. In this case, which occurs for non-voters under *Stigma*, $P(SV)_{FE} = 0 \leq P(SV)_F = P(H)_F$; (iv) $s + m - c < -S \leq s + m - c + z$. In this case, which occurs for voters under *Pride*, $P(SV)_F = 0 \leq P(SV)_{FE} = P(H)_{FE}$. Under *Pride*, cases (i), (ii), and (iv) apply and pairwise comparisons for all these cases show $P(SV)^v_{FE} \geq P(SV)^v_F$. Under *Stigma*, cases (i), (ii), and (iii) apply and pairwise comparisons for all these cases show $P(SV)^{nv}_{FE} \leq P(SV)^{nv}_F$.

Turning to $P(SV)_{OO}$ and $P(SV)_{OOE}$, consider that, conditional on seeing the flyer, any person who answers the door will complete the survey. (Otherwise, this person could have costlessly opted out.) Therefore, the results on $P(SV)_{OO}$ and $P(SV)_{OOE}$ follow directly from the results on $P(H)_{OOE}$ and $P(H)_{OO}$.

Proof of Proposition 3. A voter will lie if $s_N - L + I \geq s_V$ or $-(s_V - s_N) - L \geq -I$. Under the assumption $s_V - s_N > 0$ and given $L \geq 0$, the left-hand side in the second expression is always negative; hence, a voter will never lie with no inducement ($I = 0$). And increase in I makes it more likely that the expression will be satisfied and thus (weakly) increases lying.

We consider then a non-voter. The lying condition for non-voters is $s_V - L \geq s_N + I$ or $(s_V - s_N) - L \geq I$. The left-hand side can be positive or negative depending on whether the net signaling utility or the lying cost is larger; hence, non-voters may lie even absent incentives I. Increased incentives I make it less likely that the inequality will be satisfied and hence (weakly) reduce lying.

Proof of Proposition 4. Individuals vote if the net expected utility in (**??**) is positive. Remembering that H is the c.d.f of $-(pV + g - c)$, we can rewrite the probability of voting as $H\left[N\left[\max\left(s_V, s_N - L\right) - \max\left(s_N, s_V - L\right)\right]\right]$. Under the assumptions $s_V - s_N > 0$ and $L > 0$, it follows that $\max\left(s_V, s_N - L\right) = s_V$ and that $s_V > \max\left(s_N, s_V - L\right)$. Hence, the term in

square brackets is positive and the conclusion follows.

B   Appendix B - Estimation Appendix

The simulated method of moments estimator chooses the parameters $\hat{\xi}$ that minimize the distance given by $(m_N(\xi) - \hat{m})' W (m_N(\xi) - \hat{m})$, where $m_N(\xi)$ are the simulated moments given parameters ξ for N potential voters and $\hat{m}$ are the estimated empirical moments. In our benchmark estimations with auxiliary parameters that differ across voters and non-voters, we calculate the simulated moments with $N = 750,000$ potential voters. For benchmark estimation with auxiliary parameters that are the same across voters and non-voters, we use at least $N = 500,000$ potential voters. As a weighting matrix W, we use the diagonal of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. Hence, the estimator minimizes the sum of squared distances, weighted by the inverse of the variance of each moment. (Given the large number of moments, weighting the estimates by the inverse of the full variance-covariance matrix is problematic computationally.)

The empirical moments $\hat{m}$ are estimated in a first-stage model using the same controls as in the main regressions, and are listed in Appendix Table 1. In particular, all the moments other than the lying moments are calculated conditional on fixed effects for surveyor, location-day, and hour-of-day. The lying moments are conditional on location-day fixed-effects, given the smaller sample of survey respondents. We run OLS regressions with the relevant dependent variable (such as answering the door or completing the survey), treatment indicators for each of the relevant treatments, interacted with voters and non-voters indicators, as well as the demeaned fixed effects indicated above. (That is, we assume that the fixed effects have the same impact on voters and non-voters). We estimate these models jointly on the entire sample of voters and non-voters. We assume zero covariance between the following sets of moments: door opening, survey completion by treatment, and opting out; survey completion by whether respondent was informed about survey content; lying; and turnout.

The simulated method of moments estimator using weighting matrix W achieves asymptotic normality, with estimated variance

$$(\hat{G}'W\hat{G})^{-1}(\hat{G}'W(1 + J_m/J_s)\hat{\Lambda}W\hat{G})(\hat{G}'W\hat{G})^{-1}/N,$$

where $\hat{G} \equiv N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \nabla_\xi m_i(\hat{\xi})$, $\hat{\Lambda} \equiv Var[m(\hat{\xi})$, J_m is the number of empirical observations used to calculate a moment, and J_s is the corresponding number of simulated observations used for the moment (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 2007). We calculate $\nabla_\xi m(\hat{\xi})$ numerically in Matlab using an adaptive finite difference algorithm.

To calculate the minimum distance estimate, we employ a constrained nonlinear minimization routine implemented in Matlab as the fminsearchbnd routine. We impose the following constraints: $\mu_j \in [-100, 100]$ for $j \in \{s_V, s_N\}$ (finite social-image utilities), $\sigma_{SI} \in [0, 100]$ (positive standard deviation of social-image utilities), $L \in [0, 50]$ (non-negative lying costs), $S_s \in [0, 100]$ (social pressure non-negative), $\mu_s \in [-100, 100]$ (finite value of doing a survey), $\sigma_s \in [0, 100]$ (positive standard deviation of value of doing a survey), $h_0, r \in [0, 1]$ (probabilities between zero and one), $\eta \in [0, 0.5]$ (finite responsiveness of opening the door), $v_s \in [0, 200]$ (finite and non-negative value of time), $\mu_\varepsilon \in [-500, 500]$ (finite mean non-signaling value of voting), and $\sigma_\varepsilon \in [0, 500]$ (positive standard deviation of non-signaling value of voting).

Only two of these constraints appear to impact the estimation. First, the model cannot distinguish between large values of η, the responsiveness of opening the door. For $\eta > 0.5$, the cost to change the probability of opening the door is negligible, and therefore everyone chooses to be home or away with certainty. Second, as discussed in Section ??, the identification of σ_ϵ is one-sided: there is little difference in the simulated moments for large values of σ_ϵ. By restricting the search space for η and σ_ϵ, we aid the optimization routines without qualitatively changing the results.

We begin each run of the optimization routine by quasi-randomly choosing a starting point. First, candidate start points are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over a more targeted parameter space: $\mu_{S_V} \in [-20, 20]$, $\mu_{S_N} \in [-30, 10]$, $\sigma_{SI} \in [0, 30]$, $L \in [0, 20]$, $S_s \in [0, 10]$, $\mu_s \in [-50, 0]$, $\sigma_s \in [0, 50]$, $h_0, r \in [0.2, 0.4]$, $\eta \in [0, 0.5]$, $v_s \in [0, 100]$, $\mu_\varepsilon \in [-30, 100]$, and $\sigma_\varepsilon \in [50, 200]$. To aid the optimization, we restrict the set of randomly selected starting points to those with parameter values that imply turnout of 40-80%. To avoid selecting local minima, we choose the run with the lowest minimum squared distance of 720 runs in the model with auxiliary parameters that vary by voters and non-voters (and at least 480 runs in the model with auxiliary parameters that are the same and 256 runs in the model with exogenous voter status). For estimations with fixed values for σ_ε, we use 480 start points that imply turnout of 50-70%.

We use a slightly different estimation procedure for the estimates reported in Column 2 of Table 3 and Columns 1 and 8 of Online Appendix Table 6. First, we estimate the benchmark model with the same auxiliary parameters for voters and non-voters using 480 start points with parameter values that imply turnout of 40-80%. Second, we estimate a version of the model fixing σ_ε to the initial benchmark estimate, using 480 start points with parameter values that imply turnout of 50-70%. The best estimate from this exercise attains a lower SSE than the initial best estimate of the benchmark model, so we re-estimate the benchmark model (with flexible σ_ε) using as starting points the best 20 estimates in the fixed σ_ε model. The results of this estimation are reported in Column 2 of Table 3 and Column 1 of Online Appendix Table 6. Finally, to estimate the model in Column 8 of Online Appendix Table 6, we use as a starting point the benchmark estimate and fix the value of σ_ε.

The estimations require a large simulation size and number of start points in order to get good convergence in the parameter estimates that obtain the lowest SSE across start points. Several of the robustness analyses seem to have worse convergence properties, in particular those with mismeasurement and the robustness estimation in which we force a bad fit of the model by fixing a low standard deviation of other reasons to vote. Across estimations, there are also several parameters that seem to have worse convergence properties than others. In addition to the parameters for other reasons to vote (μ_ε and σ_ε), we find the estimates of time value and the responsiveness of the probability of opening the door vary across some estimations. In several of the robustness checks, we estimate η at the boundary of the search space.

To check the robustness of our estimates to the simulation size used, we estimated the benchmark model with larger simulation sizes using as a starting point the benchmark estimates reported in Table 3. We found that the parameter estimates from this exercise were nearly identical to the starting values, but did find variation in the estimated standard errors of μ_ε and σ_ε.

C   Appendix C - Estimation of Lying Cost in Laboratory Experiment

Erat and Gneezy (2012) study lying behavior by conducting a sender-receiver game in the lab with 517 subjects. The game provides incentives for the "sender" to lie to the "receiver", for either altruistic or selfish motives. First, the sender is informed about the true outcome from rolling a six-sided die. She is then asked to send a cheap-talk signal of the outcome to the receiver. Next, the receiver chooses one of the six possible outcomes and, if this choice matches the state, payoff bundle A is implemented; otherwise, payoff bundle B is implemented. Importantly, the sender knows the payoffs A and B, while the receiver does not. The payoffs are varied to examine how lying by the sender depends on whether the lie is likely to help the receiver at a cost to the sender (an altruistic lie), help both the sender and receiver (a pareto lie), or help the sender at the cost of the receiver (a selfish or spiteful lie).

The payoffs for lying and truth-telling in each of five decisions are listed in Online Appendix

Table 8, with the sender's payoff listed first. Thus, in Decision 1, lying results in a payoff of (19,30) - \$19 to the sender and \$30 to the receiver (assuming that the receiver chooses the signaled number). We assume a model of simple altruism with lying costs and model the sender as maximizing the utility function:

$$\max_{\{A,B\}} U = \{s_A + \alpha r_A, s_B + \alpha r_B - L + \varepsilon\}$$

where s_i is the sender's monetary payoff in outcome $i \in \{A, B\}$, r_i is the receiver's payoff, α is the sender's altruism towards the receiver, L is the psychological cost of lying and ε is a mean-zero utility shock to payoff bundle B (or equivalently, to payoff bundle A). To estimate the model, we impose the following assumptions: Lying cost L and altruism α are both assumed to be identical across individuals. The utility shock ε is distributed normally with mean zero and standard deviation σ_ε. We also assume that the receiver always follows the sender signal.

We estimate the model using a classical minimum distance estimator, with the shares lying in each decision as the five moments. The moments are weighted by the inverse of the variance of each moment. The intuition for the identification is straightforward. Conditional on altruism, the response of lying rates to the sender and receiver's monetary payoffs from lying identifies the lying cost as well as the variance of the error term.

The results suggests a substantial cost of lying, $L = \$7.0$ (se \$1.4). The estimated lying cost is consistent with the reduced form observation that a third to a half of subjects choose not to lie even when the private gain from doing is \$10 (Decisions 3 and 5). The estimated altruism is $\alpha = 0.29$ (se 0.17) – senders value a dollar to the receiver as much as 29 cents to themselves. Finally, the standard deviation of the error term is $\sigma_\varepsilon = \$18.6$ (se \$4.0). This heterogeneity is consistent with the fact that increasing the private incentive to lie from \$1 to \$10 increases lying by only 16 percentage points (Decision 2 vs. 3), suggesting a relatively low local density. At these estimated parameter values the fit of the moments is good, as Online Appendix Table 8 shows.

Extrapolated to the setting of our field experiment, this mean lying cost would imply a substantial social-image motivation for voting. In the benchmark specification, a lying cost of \$7 implies a social-image value of voting in congressional elections of \$16.9 for voters and \$18.8 for non-voters. Of course, we must be cautious in translating the lying cost estimated in this experiment to that in our survey experiments. One difference is that in our setting, the surveyor does not actually know if the respondent is lying (since our surveyors were blinded to the true voting status of the respondents and since the respondents likely are unaware that we know their voting status). In Erat and Gneezy (2012), in contrast, the sender knows that her lying or truth-telling is observed by the experimenter. In addition, the sample in Erat and Gneezy (2012) consists of undergraduate students, while our sample consists of adult voters and non-voters in Chicago suburbs.

D   Appendix D - Experiment Implementation

Each flyer distributor's participation in the study followed two steps: (1) an invitation to work as a paid volunteer for the research center and (2) participation as a distributor of flyers in the door-to-door campaign. Each surveyor's participation in the study typically followed four steps: (1) an invitation to work as a paid volunteer for the research center, (2) an in-person interview, (3) a training session, and (4) participation as a surveyor in the door-to-door campaign.

We attach the entire content of the survey for the 4 condition: (i) 10-minute survey with no incentive to lie; (ii) 10-minute survey with 8-minute incentive to lei; (iii) 5-miute sruvey with no incentive to lie; (i) 5-minute survey with \$5 incentive to lie.

Online Appendix Figure 1. Number of Times Asked about Voting

CDFs of number of times asked about turnout

Note: Online Appendix Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution function of the self-reported number of times asked among the respondents to the 2011 door-to-door survey. The continuous line refers to the 2010 Congressional election, and the dotted line refers to the 2008 Presidential election. Number of times asked about the 2010 election is the sum of times asked by friends, relatives, coworkers, and other people, each capped at 20 times asked. Number of times asked about the 2008 election is the sum of times asked by friends and relatives, each capped at 20 times asked.

Online Appendix Table 1. Results for Survey Treatments, Robustness

Specification:	OLS Regressions							
Dependent Variable:	Indicator for Answering the Door				Indicator for Completing Survey			
Group:	Voters		Non-Voters		Voters		Non-Voters	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$10/10min Treatment	0.0364**	0.0314*	0.0243	0.0254	0.0132	0.0124	0.0231***	0.0266***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
$10/5min Treatment	0.0596***	0.0518***	0.0204	0.0196	0.0683***	0.0638***	0.0467***	0.0470***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Simple Flyer Treatments	0.0128	0.0091	0.0286	0.0224	0.0960***	0.0948***	0.0496***	0.0510***
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Flyer Treatments with Opt-out	-0.0232	-0.0219	0.0052	0.0049	0.0695***	0.0731***	0.0325***	0.0349***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Mention of Election in Flyer	-0.0143	-0.0206	-0.0278**	-0.0274*	-0.0194*	-0.0238**	-0.0238***	-0.0216**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Voters Informed at Door of Election Topic					0.0001	-0.0018	0.0047	0.0085
					(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Omitted Treatment	No Flyer, $0/5min Treatment				No Flyer, $0/5min, Not Informed Treatment			
Fixed Effects for Solicitor, Date-Location, and Hour	X		X		X		X	
Fixed Effects for Solicitor-Date-Location, and Hour		X		X		X		X
R2	0.0279	0.0629	0.0338	0.0765	0.0350	0.0650	0.0269	0.0734
N	6,873	6,873	6,324	6,324	6,873	6,873	6,324	6,324

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model with standard errors, clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses. The omitted treatment is the Baseline No-Flyer $0-5 minutes survey. The regressions include fixed effects for the solicitor, for the date-town combination, and for the hour of day in Columns 1 ,3, 5, 7. The regressions include in addition fixed effects for solicitor-date-town location in Columns 2, 4, 6, 8.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Online Appendix Table 2. Results for Survey Treatments, By Time Period

Specification:	OLS Regressions											
Dependent Variable:	Indicator for Answering the Door				Indicator for Completing Survey				Indicator for Lie in Turnout Question			
Group:	Voters		Non-Voters		Voters		Non-Voters		Voters		Non-Voters	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
$10/10min Treatment	0.0510***	0.0110	0.0072	0.0460**	0.0271**	-0.0096	0.0028	0.0498***				
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)				
$10/5min Treatment	0.0609***	0.0543*	0.0039	0.0434**	0.0654***	0.0700***	0.0432***	0.0534***				
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)				
Simple Flyer Treatments	0.0094	0.0167	-0.0007	0.0683***	0.0953***	0.0928***	0.0268*	0.0815***				
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)				
Flyer Treatments with Opt-out	-0.0204	-0.0299	-0.0181	0.0356	0.0766***	0.0545***	0.0208	0.0507***				
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)				
Mention of Election in Flyer	-0.0125	-0.0140	-0.0112	-0.0472**	-0.0080	-0.0331**	-0.0207*	-0.0273**				
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)				
Voters Informed at Door of Election Topic					0.0008	-0.0053	0.0064	0.0031				
					(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)				
Treatment with Incentive to Say that Did not Vote									0.0263	0.0162	-0.1502***	-0.0777
									(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.059)
Omitted Treatment	No Flyer, $0/5min Treatment				No Flyer, $0/5min, Not Informed Treatment				No Incentive to Lie			
Time Period	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall	Summer	Fall
Solicitor, Date-Location, Hour F.e.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Date-Location F.e.									X	X	X	X
R2	0.0265	0.0325	0.0344	0.0341	0.0343	0.0423	0.0256	0.0353	0.0237	0.0745	0.0782	0.0648
N	4,245	2,628	3,459	2,865	4,245	2,628	3,459	2,865	718	418	344	253

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model with standard errors, clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses. The regressions include fixed effects for the solicitor, for the date-town combination, and for the hour of day in Columns 1-8 and fixed effects for date-location in Columns 9-12.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Online Appendix Table 3. Results for Survey Treatments, By Political Registration

Specification:	OLS Regressions								
Dependent Variable:	Indicator for Answering the Door			Indicator for Completing Survey			Lie in Turnout Question		
Political Registration:	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A. Voters									
$10/10min Treatment	0.0604**	0.0285	0.0450*	0.0272	0.0008	0.0273			
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)			
$10/5min Treatment	0.0544*	0.0550**	0.0887***	0.0827***	0.0612***	0.0677***			
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)			
Simple Flyer Treatments	-0.0169	0.0610**	-0.0250	0.0777***	0.1265***	0.0758***			
	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)			
Flyer Treatments with Opt-out	-0.0769**	0.0322	-0.0593*	0.0687***	0.0801***	0.0564**			
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)			
Mention of Election in Flyer	0.0332	-0.0295	-0.0397	0.0046	-0.0290*	-0.0344*			
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)			
Voters Informed at Door of Election Topic				-0.0121	0.0242*	-0.0242			
				(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)			
Treatment with Incentive to Say that Did not Vote							0.0319	0.0275	0.0523
							(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.054)
Omitted Treatment	No Flyer, $0/5min Treatment			No Flyer, $0/5min, Not Informed Treatment					
Solicitor, Date-Location, Hour F.e.	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Date-Location F.e.							X	X	X
R2	0.0651	0.0476	0.0512	0.0701	0.0554	0.0658	0.1660	0.0590	0.0902
N	1,918	3,018	1,937	1,918	3,018	1,937	300	565	271
Panel B. Non-Voters									
$10/10min Treatment	0.0549	0.0315	0.0245	0.1233**	0.0071	0.0193**			
	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.009)			
$10/5min Treatment	0.0078	0.0110	0.0241	0.0241	0.0461*	0.0440***			
	(0.072)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.051)	(0.026)	(0.010)			
Simple Flyer Treatments	0.0811	0.0463	0.0225	0.0916	0.0448	0.0505***			
	(0.093)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.011)			
Flyer Treatments with Opt-out	-0.0025	0.0141	0.0008	0.0560	0.0385	0.0292**			
	(0.091)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.065)	(0.028)	(0.011)			
Mention of Election in Flyer	-0.0832	-0.0433	-0.0181	-0.1148***	-0.0114	-0.0215**			
	(0.069)	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.009)			
Voters Informed at Door of Election Topic				-0.0070	0.0046	0.0031			
				(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.009)			
Treatment with Incentive to Say that Did not Vote							0.0000	-0.1998*	-0.0970**
							(0.265)	(0.112)	(0.045)
Omitted Treatment	No Flyer, $0/5min Treatment			No Flyer, $0/5min, Not Informed Treatment					
Political Registration	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other
Solicitor, Date-Location, Hour F.e.	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Date-Location F.e.							X	X	X
R2	0.2710	0.0816	0.0381	0.2945	0.0706	0.0309	0.3762	0.2994	0.0986
N	351	1,179	4,794	351	1,179	4,794	42	126	429

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model with standard errors, clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses. The regressions include fixed effects for the solicitor, for the date-town combination, and for the hour of day in Columns 1-8 and fixed effects for date-location in Columns 9-12.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Online Appendix Table 4. Incentives to Change Reporting of Voting Status, Robustness

Specification:	OLS Regressions			
Dependent Variable:	Indicator for Lie (Stated Voting Does not Match Official Voting Record)			
Group:	Voters		Non-Voters	
	(1)	(6)	(7)	(12)
All Survey Respondents				
Time or Monetary Incentive	0.0225	0.0229	-0.1190***	-0.1199***
To say Did Not Vote	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.043)
N	1,136	1,136	597	597
Omitted Treatment	No incentive to say did not vote			
Fixed Effects for Location-Day	X	X	X	X
Fixed Effects for Solicitor		X		X
Fixed Effects for Hour		X		X

Notes: Estimates for a linear probability model with standard errors, clustered by solicitor-date, in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Online Appendix Table 5. Simulated Minimum-Distance Estimates, Additional Robustness Results

Voting Parameters	Benchmark	20% Voters Mismeasured	10% Voters and Non-Voters Mismeasured	Assume Asked about Voting Twice as Often	Including Households Not Reached	Include GOTV Moment	No I/NI Moments	No Lying Incentive Moments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mean Social Image Value of Saying Voted (μ_V)	-3.9 (1.47)	-3.2 (1.33)	-3.6 (1.55)	-4.5 (2.15)	-4.3 (1.49)	-4.1 (1.23)	-11.6 (2.86)	-5.1 (1.92)
Mean Social Image Value of Saying Did Not Vote (μ_N)	-11.3 (1.77)	-11.6 (1.87)	-9.4 (2.19)	-11.7 (3.50)	-11.2 (1.76)	-11.4 (1.67)	-22.5 (3.79)	-12.2 (1.98)
Std. Dev. of Social Image Values (σ_{SI})	9.5 (1.29)	8.0 (1.41)	7.8 (2.37)	9.2 (4.11)	8.7 (1.45)	9.4 (1.51)	16.7 (3.24)	10.0 (assumed)
Lying Cost in $ (L)	7.6 (1.21)	7.3 (0.82)	7.1 (1.83)	5.7 (1.6)	5.8 (4.38)	6.8 (0.89)	12.4 (4.31)	4.7 (4.57)
Mean Value of Other Reasons to Vote (μ_ε)	64.1 (167.90)	12.0 (53.54)	10.0 (16.22)	23.6 (16.92)	16.2 (62.37)	27.5 (20.62)	95.1 (183.60)	10.5 (33.88)
Std. Dev. of Other Reasons to Vote (σ_ε)	318.7 (691.37)	125.7 (208.62)	95.1 (67.4)	191.5 (73.14)	113.0 (272.11)	161.7 (82.76)	460.0 (740.33)	77.2 (168.86)

Implications for Value of Voting and GOTV	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter
Implied Value of Voting "To Tell Others" (Benchmark N=5.4)	18.3 (4.6)	13.3 (3.3)	23.9 (6.3)	14.2 (11.8)	20.3 (3.6)	6.1 (2.3)	33.4 (9.0)	13.0 (5.9)	16.3 (5.7)	7.7 (13.2)	18.1 (2.3)	9.9 (3.7)	26.8 (5.6)	16.8 (13.1)	13.5 (7.7)	4.0 (11.3)
Implied Change in Turnout if Asked About Voting Twice as Often	+0.018 (0.008)		+0.053 (0.067)		+0.045 (0.012)		+0.041 (0.006)		+0.037 (0.007)		+0.030 (0.004)		+0.017 (0.004)		+0.038 (0.005)	
Utility from being Asked about Voting Once	-2.8 (1.2)	-5.9 (1.5)	-2.2 (1.4)	-6.2 (1.6)	-2.2 (1.2)	-5.1 (2.0)	-2.9 (1.7)	-5.5 (2.9)	-2.8 (1.2)	-5.5 (1.9)	-2.6 (1.1)	-5.6 (1.4)	-9.1 (2.7)	-13.5 (3.5)	-2.9 (1.6)	-5.1 (1.4)
Implied GOTV Effect (N+1)	+0.003 (0.001)		+0.011 (0.023)		+0.009 (0.002)		+0.004 (0.0006)		+0.007 (0.002)		+0.006 (0.001)		+0.003 (0.001)		+0.008 (0.002)	
Implied Number of GOTV Subjects to Get One Additional Vote (N+1)	295 (84.9)		95 (90)		105 (84.0)		239 (214.3)		139 (192.2)		166 (39.8)		309 (132.1)		130 (248.2)	
Utility Cost to Get One Additional Vote (N+1)	1189 (2684.4)		362 (360.8)		357 (146.7)		944 (908.6)		540 (560.4)		634 (211.1)		3344 (1104.2)		491 (914.5)	

SSE (benchmark moments)	160.3	157.6	159.4	160.2		160.1	212.8	235.7
SSE (moments used in estimation)					180.4	160.3	110.4	143.1

Notes: Estimates from simulated minimum-distance estimator using the moments in Appendix Table 1 with weights given by the inverse of the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix. The sample consists of 6,873 voting households and 6,324 non-voting households. A [non-]voting household is a household in which all registered voters did [not] vote in the 2010 congressional election. Standard errors are in parentheses. SSE reports the Weighted Sum of Squared Errors.

Online Appendix Table 6. Simulated Minimum-Distance Estimates, Same Auxiliary Parameters for Voters and Non-Voters, Robustness Results

	Benchmark (Same Auxiliary Parameters)	Heterogeneous Lying Cost	Utility from Talking about Politics	10% Voters Mismeasured	Assume Asked about Voting Half as Often	Low Std. Dev. of Other Reasons to Vote	High Std. Dev. of Other Reasons to Vote	Fixed Std. Dev. of Other Reasons to Vote
Voting Parameters	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mean Social Image Value of Saying Voted (μ_V)	-4.6 (1.66)	-4.0 (1.62)	0.0 (assumed)	-1.1 (1.03)	-3.7 (1.49)	-10.4 (2.10)	-4.3 (1.25)	-4.6 (1.52)
Mean Social Image Value of Saying Did Not Vote (μ_N)	-17.2 (2.37)	-18.2 (2.84)	-7.3 (0.84)	-17.8 (2.00)	-15.2 (2.34)	-23.5 (3.64)	-17.2 (2.45)	-17.2 (2.73)
Std. Dev. of Social Image Values (σ_{SI})	15.8 (2.34)	15.9 (2.59)	9.4 (1.38)	14.7 (2.14)	14.6 (2.51)	18.1 (2.81)	16.7 (2.5)	15.8 (2.5)
Lying Cost in $ (L)	13.3 (1.31)		5.9 (1.65)	17.1 (1.87)	13.1 (2.01)	1.4 (0.07)	14.8 (2.10)	13.3 (1.62)
Mean Value of Other Reasons to Vote (μ_ε)	95.6 (109.26)	74.1 (16.19)	15.6 (19.44)	41.1 (234.61)	87.8 (277.00)	0.2 (0.42)	224.6 (32.74)	95.6 (14.64)
Std. Dev. of Other Reasons to Vote (σ_ε)	499.9 (457.74)	498.7 (826.84)	109.8 (88.77)	395.5 (1015.28)	469.3 (1279.39)	10.0 (assumed)	1000.0 (assumed)	499.9 (assumed)
Mean Lying Cost L (in $)		22.9 (4.62)						
Utility from Talking about Politics for Voters			2.1 (1.44)					
Utility from Talking about Politics for Non-Voters			-10.5 (1.95)					

Implications for Value of Voting and GOTV	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter	Voter	Non-Voter
Implied Value of Voting "To Tell Others" (Benchmark N=5.4)	33.1 (4.1)	23.3 (2.6)	47.1 (6.8)	28.0 (21.7)	16.8 (2.3)	7.0 (4.8)	55.0 (14.5)	40.5 (6.3)	15.0 (2.5)	12.4 (2.1)	5.9 (0.4)	-1.6 (0.4)	33.7 (6)	27.5 (4.6)	33.1 (5.2)	23.3 (3.4)
Implied Change in Turnout if Asked About Voting Twice as Often	+0.021 (0.0038)		+0.025 (0.0263)		+0.037 (0.0039)		+0.044 (0.1288)		+0.011 (0.0025)		+0.058 (0.009)		+0.011 (0.002)		+0.021 (0.0044)	
Utility from being Asked about Voting Once	-2.7 (1.4)	-8.3 (1.9)	-2.0 (1.8)	-9.0 (3.0)	3.8 (1.4)	-11.5 (1.9)	0.2 (0.9)	-9.3 (2.0)	-2.3 (1.3)	-7.5 (2.0)	-4.7 (1.3)	-7.6 (3)	-2.6 (1.2)	-8.5 (2)	-2.7 (1.3)	-8.3 (2.2)
Implied GOTV Effect (N+1)	+0.004 (0.0004)		+0.005 (0.0004)		+0.007 (0.0013)		+0.008 (0.0024)		+0.004 (0.0011)		+0.015 (0.002)		+0.002 (0.0005)		+0.004 (0.0004)	
Implied Number of GOTV Subjects to Get One Additional Vote (N+1)	264 (80.6)		208 (19.8)		134 (8.6)		121 (80.7)		247 (170.6)		66 (11.7)		491 (35.3)		264 (25.0)	
Utility Cost to Get One Additional Vote (N+1)	1304 (406.8)		1021 (11263.0)		306 (210.6)		446 (133.6)		1101 (531.3)		384 (38.8)		2445 (497)		1304 (361.5)	
SSE	355.7		352.9		247.5		326.1		353.4		425.7		349.8		355.6	

Notes: Estimates from simulated minimum-distance estimator using the moments in Appendix Table 1 with weights given by the inverse of the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix. The sample consists of 6,873 voting households and 6,324 non-voting households. A [non-]voting household is a household in which all registered voters did [not] vote in the 2010 congressional election. Standard errors are in parentheses. SSE reports the Weighted Sum of Squared Errors.

Online Appendix Table 7. Simulated Minimum-Distance Estimates, Exogenous Voter Status

	Voter	Non-Voter
Voting Parameters	(1)	(2)
Mean Value of saying voted	-5.9	-7.8
(μ_V for voters, μ_V-L for nonvoters)	(2.08)	(2.20)
Mean Value of saying didn't vote	-27.8	-7.4
(μ_N-L for voters, μ_N for nonvoters)	(6.27)	(1.97)
Std. Dev. of Social Image Values (σ_{SI})	13.8	6.8
	(3.78)	(1.88)
Implied Value of Voting "To Tell Others", as a Function of Lying Cost (times asked: 5.4)		
L=0	0.0	0.0
L=2	4.9	7.3
L=5	12.2	17.7
L=10	23.7	32.3
Utility from being Asked about Voting Once	-4.61	-3.72
	(2.11)	(1.79)
Auxiliary Parameters		
Mean Utility (in $) of Doing 10-Minute Survey (μ_s)	-23.0	-27.5
	(3.12)	(3.35)
Std. Dev. of Utility of Doing Survey (σ_s)	27.6	23.5
	(6.22)	(4.11)
Value of Time of One-Hour Survey (v_s)	56.6	22.3
	(14.81)	(10.25)
Social Pressure Cost (in $) of Declining Survey ($S_s$)	1.7	0.8
	(1.22)	(1.36)
Responsiveness of Probability of Opening Door (η)	0.13	0.25
	(0.1)	(0.44)
Probability of Seeing the Flyer (r)	0.38	0.30
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Baseline Probability of Opening Door (h_0)	0.38	0.36
	(0.01)	(0.01)
SSE	154.1	

Notes: Estimates from simulated minimum-distance estimator using the moments in Appendix Table 1 with weights given by the inverse of the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix. The sample consists of 6,873 voting households and 6,324 non-voting households. A [non-]voting household is a household in which all registered voters did [not] vote in the 2010 congressional election. Standard errors are in parentheses. SSE reports the Weighted Sum of Squared Errors.

Online Appendix Table 8. Moments and Estimates on Erat and Gneezy (2012)

Decision Number:	Payoffs of A (Truth)	Payoffs of B (Lie)	Fraction Lying (Empirical)	Fraction Lying (At Estimated Parameters)
1	(20, 20)	(19, 30)	33/101 (33%)	39%
2	(20, 20)	(21, 30)	49/101 (49%)	43%
3	(20, 20)	(30, 30)	66/102 (65%)	62%
4	(20, 20)	(21, 15)	38/104 (37%)	34%
5	(20, 20)	(30, 20)	57/109 (52%)	56%

Parameter Estimates:	Lying Cost	Altruism Coefficient	S.D. of error term	
	7.0 (1.4)***	0.29 (0.17)*	18.6 (4.0)***	

Notes: Estimates from minimum-distance estimator using the 5 moments shows above and weights given by the inverse of the variance of each moment.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Survey Script
(*If a minor answers the door, ask to speak to an adult.* ***Never enter a house.)***

Hi, my name is _____, and I am a student at the University of Chicago. I am working for a professor who is doing research on people's pro-social behavior.

We are conducting **confidential** _____ minute surveys in _____ today. [You would be paid $___ for your participation.] [*If in Information treatment:* The survey is about your voter participation in the 2010 congressional election.] Do you think you might be interested?

If not interested: Thank you for your time. If I may ask you one quick question, though – did you see our flyer on your door? [*Show door-hanger and record answer in your log*]

If interested: Great! Before we get started, I'd like to tell you a little bit about the survey and what we are doing to keep your answers confidential. The survey has questions about your voter participation and about your neighborhood. Also, I'd like to make sure that you know that you don't have to answer any questions you're uncomfortable with, and you can stop your participation in this survey at any time. In terms of what we'll do with the answers we get: First, we will not put your name on the survey. Second, when we put your answers in our computer, we will not enter your address information. Third, the computerized data will not be shared with third parties outside of this research project without your consent. So there is a very low risk of a breach of the confidentiality of your answers. [*If paid*: Fourth, if the survey is paid, we will ask you to sign your name saying that we paid you. This is only for accounting reasons. This payment receipt will not include your address and will not be linked with your survey response. The receipt will be scanned and stored electronically on a password protected computer. The physical copy of the receipt will be destroyed.] Finally, if you have any questions about your rights in this research study you can contact the University of Chicago's Institutional Review Board, and I can provide you their contact information later.

So, would you like to take the survey?

If yes: Great! Let's get started.
If no: Thank you for your time. If I may ask you one quick question, though – did you see our flyer on your door? [*Show door-hanger and record answer in your log*]

[*If they ask for IRB contact information, give it to them:* **Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board,** The University of Chicago, 5835 South Kimbark- Judd Hall**,** Chicago, IL 60637**,** Phone: +1 773 834-7835]

[*If they ask for PI contact information give it to them:* John List, The University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637, Phone: +1 773 340 9593]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Household Survey

Important: All questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly confidential.

Surveyor:_____ Date and time of Survey:_____

1.	Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?	☐ Yes ☐ No
We have 5 minutes of questions about your neighborhood, but if you say that you purchased your home before the year 2000 **[in the year 2000 or after]** then we have 1 extra minute of questions and we will pay you an extra $5 for answering these additional questions [*IF PAID*: for a total of $15]. If you say that you purchased your home in the year 2000 or after **[before 2000]** then we will just ask you the original 5 minutes of questions [*IF PAID*: and pay you $10 as promised]. That is, we have 5 minutes of questions, but if you tell us, no, to the question "did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after **[before the year 2000]**" then we have 1 extra minute of questions and you will earn $5 for answering these questions.		
2.	Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after **[before the year 2000]**?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Rents
3.	Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?	☐ Yes ☐ No
4.	Is this your primary residence?	☐ Yes ☐ No
5.	(If YES on #4) How many years has this been your primary residence	_____
6.	May we ask you whether you saw our flyer on your door yesterday? *[SHOW FLYER]*	☐ Yes ☐ No
7.	What percentage of your neighbors do you think are registered to vote?	_____%
8.	What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2010 congressional election?	_____%
9.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have friends asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
10.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have relatives asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
11.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have coworkers asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
12.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have any other people asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____

13.	This next question is hypothetical, but please take it seriously. Suppose a neighbor receives the visit of a door-to-door solicitor for a local charity. The neighbor gives some money because he feels bad about not giving. How much do you think he will give?	$_____
14.	Are you or were you ever registered to be an organ donor?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsure
15.	Your annual household pre-tax income:	☐ Less than $10,000 ☐$10,000 - $14,999 ☐$15,000 - $19,999 ☐$20,000 - $29,000 ☐$30,000 - $39,000 ☐$40,000 - $49,000 ☐$50,000 - $74,000 ☐$75,000 - $99,000 ☐$100,000 or over
16.	Do you remember the purchase price of your house?	_____
17 or 19.	[ASK LAST]: Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]?" would have paid an extra $5? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember
	If NO to #2 then ask the following questions:	
17.	What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2008 presidential election?	_____%
18.	What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2004 presidential election?	_____%

Comments:

HOUSEHOLD ADDRESS:_____

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Household Survey

Important: All questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly confidential.

Surveyor:_____ **Date and time of Survey:**_____

1.	**Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]?**	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Rents
	We have 5 minutes of questions about your participation in the 2010 congressional election, but if you say that you did not vote then we have 1 extra minute of questions and we will pay you an extra $5 for answering these additional questions [*IF PAID*: for a total of $15]. If you say that you voted then we will just ask you the original 5 minutes of questions. [*IF PAID*: and pay you $10 as promised.] That is, we have 5 minutes of questions, but if you tell us, no, to the question "did you vote in the 2010 congressional election" then we have 1 extra minute of questions and you will earn an additional $5 for answering these questions.	
2.	**Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
3.	**Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
4.	**Is this your primary residence?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
5.	**(If YES on #4) How many years has this been your primary residence**	_____
6.	**May we ask you whether you saw our flyer on your door yesterday?** *[SHOW FLYER]*	☐ Yes ☐ No
7.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think are registered to vote?**	_____%
8.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2010 congressional election?**	_____%
9.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have friends asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____
10.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have relatives asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____
11.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have coworkers asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____
12.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have any other people asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____

13.	This next question is hypothetical, but please take it seriously. Suppose a neighbor receives the visit of a door-to-door solicitor for a local charity. The neighbor gives some money because he feels bad about not giving. How much do you think he will give?	$_____
14.	Are you or were you ever registered to be an organ donor?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsure
15.	Your annual household pre-tax income:	☐ Less than $10,000 ☐$10,000 - $14,999 ☐$15,000 - $19,999 ☐$20,000 - $29,000 ☐$30,000 - $39,000 ☐$40,000 - $49,000 ☐$50,000 - $74,000 ☐$75,000 - $99,000 ☐$100,000 or over
16.	Do you remember the purchase price of your house?	_____
17 or 19.	[ASK LAST]: Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?" would have paid an extra $5? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember
	If NO to #2 then ask the following questions:	
17.	How many friends asked you if you voted in the 2008 presidential election?	_____
18.	How many family members asked you if you voted in the 2008 presidential election?	_____

Comments:

HOUSEHOLD ADDRESS:_____

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Household Survey

Important: All questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly confidential.

Surveyor:_____ Date and time of Survey:_____

1.	**Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No

We have 10 minutes of questions about your neighborhood, but if you say that you purchased your home before the year 2000 [in the year 2000 or after] we only have 2 minutes of questions. Either way you answer you will be paid $10. That is, we have 10 minutes of questions, but if you tell us, no, to the question "did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]" then we only have 2 minutes of questions to ask. Regardless of your answer you will earn $10.

[Show the end of the survey if answer to #2 is NO]

2.	**Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]?**	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Rents
3.	**Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
4.	**Is this your primary residence?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
5.	**(If YES on #4) How many years has this been your primary residence**	_____
6.	**May we ask you whether you saw our flyer on your door yesterday?** *[SHOW FLYER]*	☐ Yes ☐ No
7.	**[ASK IF NO on #2] Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]?" would have shortened the survey? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?**	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember

(If NO on #2 then this is the end of the survey)

7.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think are registered to vote?**	_____%
8.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2008 presidential election?**	_____%
9.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have friends asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____
10.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have relatives asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____

11.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have coworkers asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
12.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have any other people asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
13.	This next question is hypothetical, but please take it seriously. Suppose a neighbor receives the visit of a door-to-door solicitor for a local charity. The neighbor gives some money because he feels bad about not giving. How much do you think he will give?	$_____
14.	Are you or were you ever registered to be an organ donor?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsure
15.	It is unusual for me to express strong approval or disapproval of the actions of others.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
16.	Compared to your own self-respect, the respect of others means very little.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
17.	It is all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
18.	Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
19.	Your annual household pre-tax income:	☐ Less than $10,000 ☐ $10,000 - $14,999 ☐ $15,000 - $19,999 ☐ $20,000 - $29,000 ☐ $30,000 - $39,000 ☐ $40,000 - $49,000 ☐ $50,000 - $74,000 ☐ $75,000 - $99,000 ☐ $100,000 or over
20.	Do you remember the purchase price of your house at that time?	_____
21.	If you own this house, do you remember what year you bought it?	Year:_____
22.	[ASK LAST]: Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000] ?" would have shortened the survey? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember

Comments:

HOUSEHOLD ADDRESS:_____

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Household Survey

Important: All questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly confidential.

Surveyor:_____ **Date and time of Survey:_____**

1.	**Did you purchase your house in the year 2000 or after [before the year 2000]?**	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Rents
	We have 10 minutes of questions about your voter participation in the 2010 congressional election, but if you say that you did not vote then we only have 2 minutes of questions. Either way you answer you will be paid $10. That is, we have 10 minutes of questions, but if you tell us, no, to the question "did you vote in the 2010 congressional election" then we only have 2 minutes of questions to ask. Regardless of your answer you will earn $10. **[Show the end of the survey if answer to #2 is NO]**	
2.	**Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
3.	**Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
4.	**Is this your primary residence?**	☐ Yes ☐ No
5.	**(If YES on #4) How many years has this been your primary residence**	_____
6.	**May we ask you whether you saw our flyer on your door yesterday?** *[SHOW FLYER]*	☐ Yes ☐ No
7.	**[ASK IF NO on #2] Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?" would have shortened the survey? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?**	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember
	(If NO on #2 then this is the end of the survey)	
7.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think are registered to vote?**	_____%
8.	**What percentage of your neighbors do you think voted in the 2008 presidential election?**	_____%
9.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have friends asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____
10.	**Since the 2010 congressional election, have relatives asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?**	_____

11.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have coworkers asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
12.	Since the 2010 congressional election, have any other people asked whether you voted? If so, how many times?	_____
13.	This next question is hypothetical, but please take it seriously. Suppose a neighbor receives the visit of a door-to-door solicitor for a local charity. The neighbor gives some money because he feels bad about not giving. How much do you think he will give?	$_____
14.	Are you or were you ever registered to be an organ donor?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsure
15.	It is unusual for me to express strong approval or disapproval of the actions of others.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
16.	Compared to your own self-respect, the respect of others means very little.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
17.	It is all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
18.	Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.	☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
19.	Your annual household pre-tax income:	☐ Less than $10,000 ☐ $10,000 - $14,999 ☐ $15,000 - $19,999 ☐ $20,000 - $29,000 ☐ $30,000 - $39,000 ☐ $40,000 - $49,000 ☐ $50,000 - $74,000 ☐ $75,000 - $99,000 ☐ $100,000 or over
20.	Do you remember the purchase price of your house at that time?	_____
21.	If you own this house, do you remember what year you bought it?	Year:_____
22.	[ASK LAST:] Do you remember which answer to the question, "Did you vote in the 2010 congressional election?" would have shortened the survey? Which answer was it? Yes, no, or can't remember?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Can't remember

Comments:

HOUSEHOLD ADDRESS:_____