Bio
I am an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Harvard University. I graduated from UC Berkeley with a PhD in Economics in 2014.
My research tries to bring insights from psychology to bear on topics in economics, particularly topics relevant to developing countries. Recent projects include studying how improving sleep affects the economic outcomes of workers in India, how the endowment effect influences consumer demand for collateralized loans in Kenya, how research findings affect the beliefs and policy choices of mayors in Brazil, and how mixing rich and poor students in schools in India affects social preferences and behaviors.
I am a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and a faculty affiliate at the The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL). I serve as an Associate Editor at the Journal of Political Economy. Together with Frank Schilbach and Heather Schofield, I help run the Behavioral Development Lab in India.
Curriculum Vitae (Updated June 2020)
Email: grao@fas.harvard.edu
Tel: +1 (857) 998-4505
Address:
Department of Economics
Littauer Center M-30, Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
U.S.A.
Teaching (Spring 2020)
Econ 2338: Behavioral Development Economics
Econ 980: Behavioral Economics of Poverty and Development (junior seminar)
Information for (potential) advisees
Office Hours
Office hour appointments can be booked online or by email.
Online signup (students only): https://raoofficehours.as.me/
Until further notice, all office hours will be online using Zoom, at https://harvard.zoom.us/my/raogautam
Note: If the above slots don’t work for you, please email me to set up a meeting.
Publications
(with Stefano DellaVigna, John List and Ulrike Malmendier)
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 2013
Abstract (click to expand): Do men and women have different social preferences? Previous findings are contradictory. We provide a potential explanation using evidence from a field experiment. In a door-to-door solicitation, men and women are equally generous, but women become less generous when it becomes easy to avoid the solicitor. Our structural estimates of the social preference parameters suggest an explanation: women are more likely to be on the margin of giving, partly because of a less dispersed distribution of altruism. We find similar results for the willingness to complete an unpaid survey: women are more likely to be on the margin of participation.
Online Appendix
(with Stefano DellaVigna, John List and Ulrike Malmendier)
Review of Economic Studies, January 2017
Abstract (click to expand): Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting `because others will ask'. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (i) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (ii) the duration and payment for the survey, and (iii) the incentives to lie about past voting. The experimental results indicate significant social image concerns. For the 2010 Congressional election, we estimate a value of voting ‘to tell others’ of about $15, contributing 2 percentage points to turnout. Lastly, we evaluate a get-out-the-vote intervention in which we tell potential voters that we will ask if they voted.
Online Appendix
Data and Code
(with Leonardo Bursztyn, Bruno Ferman, Stefano Fiorin and Martin Kanz)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2018
Abstract (click to expand): This paper provides novel field-experimental evidence on status goods. We work with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, we show that demand for the platinum card greatly exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. Combining price variation with information on the use of the card sheds light on the magnitude of the demand for social status. In a second experiment, we provide evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. The final experiment shows that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods. We infer that part of the demand for status is psychological in nature, and that social image is a substitute for self image.
Online Appendix
Data and Code
AEA Pre-Registration
American Economic Review, March 2019
Abstract (click to expand): I exploit a natural experiment in Indian schools to study how being integrated with poor students affects the social behaviors and academic outcomes of rich students. Using administrative data, lab and field experiments to measure outcomes, I find that having poor classmates makes rich students (i) more prosocial, generous and egalitarian; and (ii) less likely to discriminate against poor students, and more willing to socialize with them. These effects are driven by personal interactions between rich and poor students. In contrast, I find mixed but overall modest impacts on rich students' academic achievement.
Online Appendix
(with Michael Kremer and Frank Schilbach)
Handbook of Behavioral Economics, Volume 2 (2019)
Slides (pdf)
Slides (tex and bib files)
Slides (ppt)
(with Liang Bai, Benjamin Handel and Ted Miguel)
Accepted, Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract (click to expand): Self-control problems constitute a potential explanation for the under-investment in preventive health in low-income countries. Behavioral economics offers a tool to solve such problems: commitment devices. We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of theoretically-motivated commitment contracts in increasing preventive doctor visits by hypertensive patients in rural India. Despite achieving high take-up of such contracts in some treatment arms, we find no effects on actual doctor visits or individual health outcomes. A substantial number of individuals pay for commitment but fail to follow through on the doctor visit, losing money without experiencing health benefits. We develop and structurally estimate a pre-specified model of consumer behavior under present bias with varying levels of naivete. The results are consistent with a large share of individuals being partially naive about their own self-control problems: sophisticated enough to demand some commitment, but overly optimistic about whether a given level of commitment is sufficiently strong to be effective. The results suggest that commitment devices may in practice be welfare diminishing, at least in some contexts, and serve as a cautionary tale about their role in health care.
Pre-Registration: Including theoretical model and pre-analysis plan
(with Matthew Ridley, Frank Schilbach and Vikram Patel)
Almost Final Version: Aug 2020
Accepted, Science
Abstract (click to expand): Why are people living in poverty disproportionately affected by mental illness? We review the interdisciplinary evidence of the bi-directional causal relationship between poverty and common mental illnesses -- depression and anxiety -- and the underlying mechanisms. Research shows that mental illness reduces employment and therefore income and that psychological interventions generate economic gains. Similarly, negative economic shocks cause mental illness, and anti-poverty programs such as cash transfers improve mental health. A crucial next step toward the design of effective policies is to better understand the mechanisms underlying these causal effects.
Working Papers
(with Jonas Hjort, Diana Moreira, and Juan Francisco Santini)
Current Version: July 2020
Conditionally Accepted, American Economic Review
Abstract (click to expand): Can research findings change political leaders' beliefs and cause policy change? Collaborating with the National Confederation of Municipalities in Brazil, we work with 2,150 municipalities and their mayors. We use experiments to measure mayors' demand for research information and their response to learning research findings. In one experiment, we find that mayors and other municipal officials are personally willing to pay to learn the results of impact evaluations, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing on average between studies conducted in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy (reminder letters for taxpayers) increases the probability that their municipality implements the policy by 10 percentage points. In sum, we provide direct evidence that policy-makers value research information, change their beliefs when presented with it, and that this can drive policy change. Information frictions may thus help explain failures to adopt effective policies.
(with Pedro Bessone, Frank Schilbach, Heather Schofield and Mattie Toma)
Current Version: November 2020
Revised and Resubmitted, Quarterly Journal of Economics
Abstract (click to expand): Using state-of-the-art technology, we document that adults in Chennai sleep only 5.5 hours per night on average despite spending 8 hours in bed. Their sleep is highly interrupted, with sleep efficiency---sleep per time in bed---comparable to those with disorders such as sleep apnea or insomnia. A randomized three-week treatment providing information, encouragement, and improvements to home sleep environments increased sleep duration by 27 minutes per night but came at the cost of more time in bed. Contrary to expert predictions, increased night sleep had no detectable effects on cognition, productivity, decision-making or well-being, and led to small decreases in labor supply. Yet, increased sleep can have benefits in this setting: short afternoon naps at the workplace improved an overall index of outcomes by 0.12 standard deviations, with significant increases in productivity, psychological well-being, and cognitive function, but less time available for work.
Pre-Registration
(with Stefano DellaVigna, John List and Ulrike Malmendier)
Current Version: June 2019
Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Review
Abstract (click to expand): We design two field experiments to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers’ social preferences towards their employers. Unlike previous gift-exchange field experiments, we vary piece rates in addition to gift treatments. This piece-rate design allows us to estimate the elasticity of effort to motivation and in turn identify aspects of the workers’ social preferences. The first experiment measures productivity—units of output produced in a fixed amount of time. The second experiment measures a form of labor supply—the willingness to work for extra time. Using the piece-rate treatments, we document that productivity is rather unresponsive to motivation, while labor supply is very responsive. In terms of social preferences, we document, first, that workers provide effort for their employer, but are insensitive to the return to the employer. This result is consistent with models of ’warm glow’ or social norms, rather than pure altruism towards the employer. Second, while we do not detect any effect of the gifts in the productivity experiment, we find sizable positive impacts in the labor-supply experiment. We show that, at least in part, this different response to gifts is explained by different elasticities of productivity and labor supply, highlighting the importance of the piece-rate design.
AEA Pre-Registration: This includes a full pre-registration of the structural model
Work in Progress
The Endowment Effect and Collateralized Loans
(with Kevin Carney, Xinyue Lin, and Michael Kremer)
Slides
The Economic Consequences of Depression
(with Jon de Quidt, Johannes Haushofer, Frank Schilbach, and Pierre-Luc Vautrey)
The Long-Run Impacts of Corporal Punishment in Schools
(with Maria Petrova and Brian Wheaton)
Learning in the Household
(with John Conlon, Matthew Ridley and Frank Schilbach)
From Another Life
Interactions between Organizations and Networks in Common-Pool Resource Governance, with Arun Agrawal, Dan Brown, Rick Riolo and Derek Robinson, Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 25, January 2013, Pages 138–146
Preservation or degradation? Communal management and ecological change in a southeast Michigan forest, with Fred Nelson, Elisa Collins, Alain Frechette, Cynthia Koenig, Mosé Jones-Yellin, Brihannala Morgan, Gita Ramsay, and Claudia Rodriguez, Biodiversity and Conservation, October 2008, Volume 17, Issue 11, pp 2757-2772
Personal
Current reason I’m behind on everything
Fearless Sidekick - Kirby passed in Aug 2016
Website: I am grateful to Xinyue Lin for building my website. Please feel welcome to use and re-purpose the code for the website, which you can find at my GitHub repository.
